A Re-examination of the Liberty of Press and Media Shield Laws After Knight-Ridder Broadcasting, Inc. v. Greenberg by Mason, Stephen G.
Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development 
Volume 2 
Issue 2 Volume 2, 1987, Issue 2 Article 5 
March 1987 
A Re-examination of the Liberty of Press and Media Shield Laws 
After Knight-Ridder Broadcasting, Inc. v. Greenberg 
Stephen G. Mason 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcred 
Recommended Citation 
Mason, Stephen G. (1987) "A Re-examination of the Liberty of Press and Media Shield Laws After Knight-
Ridder Broadcasting, Inc. v. Greenberg," Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development: Vol. 2 : Iss. 2 , 
Article 5. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcred/vol2/iss2/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development by an authorized editor of St. 
John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE
LIBERTY OF PRESS AND MEDIA
SHIELD LAWS AFTER KNIGHT-
RIDDER BROADCASTING, INC. V.
GREENBERG
It has been fifteen years since the Supreme Court handed down
the landmark decision in Branzburg v. Hayes,' refusing to establish
a testimonial privilege for the press2 under the first amendment to
the United States Constitution.3 Yet, the press has not been with-
out privilege.' In the years since Branzburg, lower courts have
wrestled with the language of Justice Powell's concurrence5 which
suggested that a qualified constitutional privilege for the press
might be upheld under certain circumstances,' or have distin-
guished Branzburg, to find such a privilege. Moreover, for almost
a century state legislatures have sought to protect the press and its
confidential sources and information through the enactment of
privilege statutes, commonly known as shield laws.' Nevertheless,
the wisdom of a testimonial privilege for the press remains a con-
troversial issue.'
Recently, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the issue in
a decision construing the New York State Shield Law."0 This arti-
cle will explain, in broad terms, the propriety of the court of ap-
408 U.S. 665 (1972).
'See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 690. For a discussion of the Branzburg case see infra notes
41-43 and accompanying text.
* U.S. CONST. amend. i. The first amendment provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall
make no law .. .abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ..... Id.
" See infra notes 42, 69 and accompanying text.
' Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709-10.
* See id. at 709. See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 42, 69 and accompanying text.
* See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
* See generally M. VAN GERPEN, PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION AND THE PREss (1979); C.
WHALEN, YOUR RIGHT -To KNOW (1973); Bills to Protect Newsmen from Compulsory Disclosure,
AM. ENTER. INST. (1971); Newsman's Privilege Legislation, AM ENTER. INST (1973).
" See infra note 14 and accompanying text.
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peals decision through a critical re-examination of both the quali-
fied privilege enjoyed by the press under the first amendment,
and the proper scope of state shield laws.
I. KNIGHT-RIDDER BROADCASTING, INC. V. GREENBERG
In 1970, New York amended its Civil Rights Law to include a
shield law provision, Section 79-h. 11 Twice amended since enact-
ment,12 New York's Shield Law has been construed as affording
" N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1987). The New York Shield
Law provides in pertinent part:
(a)(8) "News" shall mean written, oral, pictorial, photographic, or electronically
recorded information or communication concerning, local, national or worldwide
events or other matters of public concern or public interest or affecting the public
welfare.
(b) Exemption of professional journalists and newscasters from contempt. Notwith-
standing the provisions of any general or specific law to the contrary, no professional
journalist or newscaster presently or having previously been employed or otherwise
associated with any newspaper, magazine, news agency, press association, wire ser-
vice, radio or television transmission station or network or other professional me-
dium of communicating news or information to the public shall be adjudged in con-
tempt by any court, the legislature or other body having contempt powers, nor shall
a grand jury seek to have a journalist or newscaster held in contempt by any court,
legislature or other body having contempt powers for refusing or failing to disclose
any news or the source of any such news coming into his possession in the course of
gathering or obtaining news for publication or to be published in a newspaper, mag-
azine, or for broadcast by a radio or television transmission station or network or for
public dissemination by any other professional medium or agency which has as one
of its main functions the dissemination of news to the public, by which he is profes-
sionally employed or otherwise associated in a news gathering capacity notwithstand-
ing that the material or identity of a source of such material or related material
gathered by a person described above performing a function described above is or is
not highly relevant to a particular inquiry of government and nothwithstanding that
the information was not solicited by the journalist or newscaster prior to disclosure
to him.
(c) Any information obtained in violation of the provisions of this section shall be
inadmissible in any action or proceeding or hearing before any agency.
(d) No fine or imprisonment may be imposed against a person for any refusal to
disclose information privileged by the provisions of this section.
(e) The privilege contained within this section shall apply to supervisory or em-
ployer third person or organization having authority over the person described in
this section.
N.Y. Civ. RiGH"s LAW § 79-h(a)(8)-(e) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
12 See N.Y. Civ. RIH-rs LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1976). The statute was amended in 1975
to include "nor shall a grand jury seek to have a journalist or newscaster held in contempt
by any court, legislature or other body having contempt powers." Id. The 1981 amend-
ment, inter alia, broadened the scope of professional journalists to whom the statute ap-
plied to include those involved in "the processing and researching of news intended for
dissemination to the public," and to those who may be "'regular employee[s] or . .. other-
wise professionally affiliated .... " Id. (McKinney Supp. 1987). Other significant provisions
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the media an extremely broad protection.13 However, in Knight-
Ridder Broadcasting, Inc. v. Greenberg,4 the New York Court of
Appeals constrained the scope of the New York statute."
In Knight-Ridder, an Albany television station was served with a
grand jury subpoena duces tecum.'6 The subpoena demanded out-
takes and other materials in the station's possession relating to an
interview conducted with a man who, subsequent to the interview,
became a murder suspect in the investigation of his wife's death.'"
The station refused to comply with the subpoena,' 8 claiming both
shield law protection and exemption from disclosure under the
first amendment.'t Both claims, however, were rejected. In a
four to three decision, the court of appeals settled the rule that
New York's Shield Law could not be invoked to prevent the dis-
closure of information proffered to a newsgatherer unless it had
been offered in confidence." The station had been unable to
of the amendment afforded protection to information whether it "is or is not highly rele-
vant to a particular inquiry of government" and made immaterial whether the information
was or "was not solicited by the journalist or newscaster . I... "d  Finally, the 1981 amend-
ment provided that information obtained in violation of the statute "be inadmissible in any
action or proceeding" and that "no fine or imprisonment may be imposed ... for any
refusal to disclose information privileged" by the statute. Id.
13 See Beach v. Shanley, 62 N.Y.2d 241, 251, 465 N.E.2d 304, 310, 476 N.Y.S.2d 765,
771 (1984) (New York shield law affords journalists broad protection); see also Oak Beach
Inn v. Babylon Beacon, 62 N.Y.2d 158, 165, 464 N.E.2d 967, 970, 476 N.Y.S.2d 269, 272
(1984) (amendments to New York's shield law have clarified and broadened the statute),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158 (1985); Note, Beach v. Shanley: An Expansive Interpretation of
New York's "Shield Law", 49 Ama. L. REV. 748, 779 (1985) (language of New York shield law
suggests it should be broadly applied).
14 70 N.Y.2d 151, 511 N.E.2d 1116, 518 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1987).
" See infra note 21 and accompanying text.
" See C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984). The subpoena
duces tecum is a writ, issued by a court, which demands that one in possession of documents
or other physical evidence attend trial and bring such evidence as required by the sub-
poena. Id. § 3, at 5.
1 Knight-Ridder Broadcasting, Inc. v. Greenberg, 70 N.Y.2d 151, 153-54, 511 N.E.2d
1116, 1117, 518 N.Y.S.2d 595, 596 (1987). A news reporter for WTEN-TV obtained a
taped interview with Donald Bent in connection with his wife who had been missing for
several days; only one minute of the entire interview became part of an actual newscast. Id.
Mrs. Bent was eventually found dead in the trunk of an automobile. Id.
18 Id. at 154, 511 N.E.2d at 1117, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 596. WTEN-TV released only that
one minute of the interview actually broadcast, a written introduction read from the stu-
dio, and a list of "supers" which had appeared during the newscast. Id.
19 Id.
20 See id. at 153, 160, 511 N.E.2d at 1117, 1121, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 596, 600.
21 See id. at 153, 511 N.E.2d at 1117, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 596. The court held that: "The
issue... is whether the Shield Law ... extends its protection to nonconfidential sources or
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make such a showing.2 Additionally, the court was unpersuaded
that the materials sought were protected under a qualified first
amendment privilege for the press.'3
It is submitted that the court of appeals gave proper effect to
the purpose of the New York Shield Law and wisely rejected the
station's claim to a constitutional privilege under the first amend-
ment. It is further submitted, however, that the opinions of both
the majority and the dissent relied excessively upon statutory in-
terpretation. It is suggested that the court should have employed
a more balanced analysis rooted in constitutional and statutory
policy considerations vis-a-vis the competing interests at stake.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE
A. Background
The key relationship at stake in the press privilege debate has
been that of the newsman and his source or informant. 4 Histori-
information .... We hold that it does not." Id.
" Id. at 154, 511 N.E.2d at 1117, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 596 (at the time of appeal it was
unclear whether any portion of the interview had been conducted in confidence).
23 Id. at 160, 511 N.E.2d at 1121, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 600. The court found that the mate-
rials sought were not protected by the first amendment since the interview contained "rele-
vant information necessary to the Grand Jury investigation [which was] unavailable from
other sources ...." Id.
Constitutionally, a newsman's privilege is especially problematic when it conflicts with
the rights of criminal defendants to confront the witnesses against them. See, e.g., In re
Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978). In this much cele-
brated case, New York Times reporter Myron Farber refused to comply with a defendant's
subpoena duces tecum. Id. at 263, 394 A.2d at 332. The court held that a defendant assert-
ing his legitimate sixth amendment right created an obligation "at least as compelling as
the duty to appear before a grand jury," and that the first amendment did not provide
newsmen with a privilege to refuse to appear before a grand jury. Id. at 268-69, 394 A.2d
at 334. The Farber court pointed up that the relevant section of the New Jersey Constitu-
tion was identical to the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment. Id. at 273-74, 394
A.2d at 337. See also Lewis, Rights and Responsibilities of the Newsman, in RIGHrs AND RE-
SPONSIBILITIES 231, 238-39 (1980).
4 Cf. Hammarley v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 388, 397-98, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608,
613 (1979). Courts have protected the media's editorial processes as well, holding that the
"statutory privilege . . .encompasses all information acquired by the newsman in the
course of his professional activities .... I Id. See also In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 40, 193 A.2d
181, 184 (1963) ("The common and approved meaning or usage of the words 'source of
information' includes documents .). But cf. Bartlett v. Superior Court, 150 Ariz. 178,
184, 722 P.2d 346, 352 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (video tape not protected); Lexington Her-
ald-Leader Co. v. Beard, 690 S.W.2d 374, 377-78 (Ky. 1984) (the statute "grants a privi-
lege from disclosing the source of the information but does not grant a privilege against
disclosing the information itself." (quoting Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Ky.
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cally, privileges have been rooted in the belief that it is better to
foster certain key relationships than to expedite the fact-finding
process."' Yet the common law, with few exceptions,2 has not
conferred upon the press a testimonial privilege,27 adhering to the
settled rule "that the public . . . has a right to every man's
evidence."2
1971))).
" See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 16, § 75, at 180. The two privileges established at com-
mon law were those of husband-wife and attorney-client. Id. The husband-wife privilege
had as its foundation the general rule that spouses and other interested parties were dis-
qualified from testifying for one another. Id. § 78, at 188. The movement for a marital
privilege separate from the rule for disqualification did not actually exist until the nine-
teenth century; its premise being that to compel the disclosure of private communications
between a husband and wife would be harmful to society. Id. at 189. It is generally held
that the attorney-client privilege was born of the barrister's oath of honor as early as the
time of Elizabeth. Id. § 87, at 204. Its rationale is that the ends of justice are best served
when a client is able to make full and complete disclosure to his attorney. Id. at 204-05. Of
those privileges enacted by statute the most common are clergy-penitent and physician-
patient. Id. § 76.2, at 184. See generally W. RICHARDSON, RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE § 410, at
403-04 U. Prince 10th ed. 1973), 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2290, 2232-33 (3d ed. 1940).
Dean Wigmore, in an effort to codify the criteria for cases in which the conferring of
privileges should be granted, set forth the following four preconditions:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed;
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory mainte-
nance of the relation between the parties; (3) The relation must be one which in the
opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered; and (4) The injury that
would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communication must be greater
than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.
Id. § 2285, at 531.
" See Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 715-16 (3d Cir. 1979) (journalists have
federal common law privilege against compulsory disclosure of sources absent a "demon-
strated, specific need for evidence" (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)));
Lewis v. United States, 517 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1975) (in federal question cases federal law
is controlling on the issue of privileges).
" See infra note 47 and accompanying text. See Ex parte Nugent, 18 F. Cas. 471 (D.C.
Cir. 1848) (No. 10,375). As early as 1858 a news reporter was cited for contempt and jailed
by order of the United States Senate for refusing to reveal the source of his information.
Id. at 471-72. John Nugent, a reporter for the New York Herald, had obtained copies of
amendments, made by the United States Senate, to a treaty between the United States and
Mexico. Id. Nugent had published copies of the amendments in the Herald. Id. See also
Comment, The Newsman's Privilege After Branzburg: The Case for a Federal Shield Law, 24
UCLA L. REv. 160, 161 (1976) (Nugent began battle for newsman's privilege).
" 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 25, § 2192, at 64. Dean Wigmore contended that "[nmo
pledge of privacy, nor oath of secrecy, can avail against demand for the truth in a court of
justice." Id. § 2286, at 532. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690 n.29 (1972). The
creation of new testimonial privileges has not been favored as it "obstructs the search for
truth." Id. But see 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER. WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 5011031, at 501-30
(1986) (courts may develop "new privileges, on a case by case basis.").
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B. The Rise of a Qualified Privilege
The first case to address the possibility of a press privilege
rooted in the first amendment was decided in 1958. In Garland v.
Torre,29 celebrity Judy Garland sought to compel Marie Torre to
disclose the confidential source of defamatory accusations made
about her in Torre's newspaper column. 0 Torre refused to dis-
close her source and was cited for contempt by the district court.8 1
On appeal to the Second Circuit, the contempt citation was af-
firmed. 5 The opinion is generally cited as foreshadowing a doc-
trine whereby upon a proper balancing of competing interests the
press might be accorded a constitutional privilege to withhold its
sources in judicial proceedings.8 8 It is submitted that, fundamen-
" 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958). See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 655 (1972). Writing of the Garland case, the Branzburg Court stated that "Jiln 1958, a
news gatherer asserted for the first time that the First Amendment exempted confidential
information from public disclosure .... Id. at 685-86. See Guest & Stanzler, The Constitu-
tional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 Nw. UL. REV. 18, 21-22 (1969);
Morse & Zuker, The Journalists' Privilege, in TEsriMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 8.04, at 413 (S.
Stone & R. Liebman ed. 1983); Comment, The Newsman's Qualified Privilege: An Analytical
Approach, 16 CAL. W.L. REV. 331, 335 (1980); Comment, supra note 27, at 170.
30 Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958). In her
column, Torre claimed that the source of her information was a CBS network executive.
Id. at 547. CBS denied it had made the "alleged false and defamatory statements .... " Id.
Torre, in testimony, confirmed that the statements were made to her by an executive at
CBS, but refused to reveal his identity. d.
11 Id. Torre was sentenced to ten days in jail for criminal contempt but was released
upon her own recognizance. Id. at n.2. See Marcus, The Reporter's Privilege: An Analysis of the
Common Law, Branzburg v. Hayes, and Recent Statutory Developments, 25 ARiz. L. REV. 816,
820 (1983). "While common law judges have expressly rejected the privilege . . . [they]
were not at all tough in their treatment of journalists who refused to disclose sources," Id.
" See Garland, 259 F.2d at 550-51. The court found that "the Constitution conferred no
right to refuse an answer." Id.
" See Morse & Zuker, supra note 29, § 8.04, at 413. "The [Garland] court's emphasis
that the information . . . was relevant, material, and went to the heart of the matter sug-
gested that other kinds of information would not be discoverable. The groundwork for the
privilege had been laid." Id. at 414. See also O'Neil, Shield Laws: Partial Solution to a Perva-
sive Problem, 20 N.Y.L.F. 515, 527 (1975) (constitutional principle was presented and way
paved for the future); Comment, supra note 29, at 335 (journalists' first amendment privi-
lege depends upon the outcome of balancing test); cf. Guest & Stanzler, supra note 29, at
37-39 (Torre decision less concrete with regard to a constitutional journalist's privilege).
See Garland, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958). The Garland deci-
sion accepted, with a mitigating footnote, the "hypothesis that compulsory disclosure of
confidential sources . . . may entail an abridgement of press freedom." Id. at 548. Yet, the
decision noted as well that members of the media did not possess a right of access to news
by virtue of their "professional status," greater than that possessed by others. Id. at 548
n.4 (citing United Press Ass'ns v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954); Tribune
Review Publishing Co. v. Thomas, 254 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1958)).
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tally, Garland enunciated a balanced view of the first amendment
rightly in accord with proper constitutional aims. Freedom of the
press is primarily freedom from previous restraints; it is not an
absolute."
For more than a decade after Garland, claims of a first amend-
ment press privilege were unsuccessful," and it was not until
Judicial recognition of the balancing test has also seized upon Garland as an influential
decision. See, e.g., Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 784 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding in Gar-
land is carefully circumscribed), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); Caldwell v. United
States, 434 F.2d 1081, 1090-91 (9th Cir. 1970) (Jameson, J., concurring), rev'd sub nom.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); see also Gulliver's Periodicals, Ltd. v. Chas. Levy
Circulating Co., 455 F. Supp. 1197 (N.D. I1. 1978). In addressing a reporter's claim of
privilege by balancing the competing interests:
[A] court should consider: the nature of the case at bar; the relevance and material-
ity of the information sought to be adduced; whether the information sought goes to
the heart of, is crucial to, the claims made by the discovering party and the issues
framed by the pleadings; and the availability of the information from other sources.
Id. at 1202-03.
" See Garland, 259 F.2d at 548. Although acknowledging the importance of liberty for
the press, Justice Stewart refused to enunciate a first amendment theory under which the
press would be an elevated interest:
Freedom of the press, hard-won over the centuries by men of courage, is basic to a
free society. But basic too are courts of justice, armed with the power to discover
truth. The concept that it is the duty of a witness to testify in a court of law has
roots fully as deep in our history as does the guarantee of a free press.
Id. See also supra note 28 and accompanying text.
" See In re Goodfader, 45 Haw. 317, 367 P.2d 472 (1961). In Goodfader, a reporter had
attended a meeting of a city civil service commission on a confidential tip that the commis-
sion was going to call for the ouster of one of its members. Id. at 319, 367 P.2d at 475. At
a trial in connection with the commission's actions the reporter was deposed and stated
that he had been informed a week and a half prior to the incident that the ouster was
imminent. Id. On cross-examination the reporter refused to reveal his source, claiming a
first amendment privilege. Id. at 319-21, 367 P.2d at 475-76. The reporter contended that
implicit in the freedom to print news was the freedom to gather it, and that being forced
to divulge his source constituted a restraint on gathering, and thus an impairment of his
first amendment rights. Id. at 327, 367 P.2d at 479. In rejecting the claim, the court ac-
knowledged that compulsory disclosure may disadvantage a reporter, yet it found no au-
thority under which such disadvantage was deemed a violation of the constitutional right to
gather news. Id. at 327-28, 367 P.2d at 479. The court conceded that disclosure may im-
pair press freedom, but concluded that the impairment was not of sufficient weight as to
warrant the granting of privilege. d. at 329, 367 P.2d at 480 (citing Garland v. Torre, 259
F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958)). See also State v. Buchanan, 250 Or.
244, 436 P.2d 729, cert denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968). In Buchanan, the Supreme Court of
Oregon rejected a school newspaper reporter's claim to a first amendment privilege. Id. at
245-48, 436 P.2d at 729-31. The reporter had promised anonymity to seven subjects whom
she interviewed regarding their use of marijuana. Id. at 246, 436 P.2d at 730. The article
attracted considerable attention upon publication, including that of the district attorney.
Id. at 246-47, 436 P.2d at 730. In rejecting the reporter's first amendment claim the court
focused on three factors which fundamentally impair the logic of a press privilege based on
the first amendment: First, the court stated that "news gatherers have no constitutional
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1970, in Caldwell v. United States,53 that such a privilege was suc-
cessfully invoked. In Caldwell, the Ninth Circuit upheld a first
amendment press privilege to quash a grand jury subpoena. Cald-
well held that, in order to defeat a journalist's qualified testimonial
privilege under the first amendment, the government would be
required to establish both an overriding and compelling need for
confidential information sought, as well as its lack of an alterna-
tive source for obtaining such information . 7  Thus, Caldwell
brought to fruition the balancing test and first amendment privi-
lege first suggested in Garland."
Consolidated with three other cases,3' Caldwell was reversed in
Branzburg v. Hayes,40 the benchmark 1972 Supreme Court deci-
right to information which is not accessible to the public generally." Id. at 248, 436 P.2d at
731. Secondly, the court surmised that freedom of the press belonged to the public, and
that it was "not the private preserve of those who possess the implements of publishing."
Id. at 249, 436 P.2d at 731. Finally, the court presciently touched on the concern voiced by
Justice White in Branzburg when it stressed the practical deficiencies of a constitutional
privilege based upon "class". Id. The court reasoned that "a special privilege to a special
class of 'news gatherers' necessarily draws after it an invitation to the government to define
the membership of that class." Id. But see Adams v. Associated Press, 46 F.R.D. 439 (S.D.
Tex. 1969), cert. dismissed, 402 U.S. 901 (1971) (the court recognized the existence of a
first amendment shield, but compelled disclosure as the source's identity-went to the "heart
of the claim").
" Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd sub nom. Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). Earl Caldwell was a news journalist employed by The New
York Times. Id. at 1082. His work focused primarily on the activities of the Black Panther
Party, a minority group militant organization. Id. He was subpoenaed by a grand jury in-
vestigating possible criminal activity of the Black Panthers in violation of federal law. Id.
Caldwell acknowledged that over time he had "won the confidence and trust of party lead-
ers." Id. at 1084.
"' See Caldwell, 434 F.2d at 1089. In balancing the competing interests, the court held
that "the public's First Amendment right to be informed would be jeopardized by requir-
ing a journalist to submit to secret Grand Jury interrogation .... ." Id. However, the court
tempered this against the idea that if the government could demonstrate a compelling need
for the information the privilege would be lost. Id. The "alternative source" component of
the balancing test flows from the fact that the journalist contended that his appearance
before the grand jury was unnecessary insofar as he had already made public the informa-
tion sought. Id. Concurring, Judge Jameson wondered whether journalists ought to be re-
quired to comply but under protective order, thus enabling the government to establish its
compelling and overriding need after a witness has appeared. Id. at 1092 Uameson, J.,
concurring).
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
8, Branzburg v. Meigs, 503 S.W.2d 748 (Ky. 1971), aff d sub nom. Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665 (1972); Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1970), aff d sub nom.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297
(1971), aff d sub nom. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
,0 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
195
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sion on press privilege. Branzburg held that a journalist had no
first amendment right to refuse to comply with a state or federal
grand jury subpoena.4 1 However, Justice Powell's concurrence,
which forged the decision, has often been cited4 as leaving open
the possibility for a first amendment privilege for the press which
might be upheld absent the particular circumstances which accom-
panied the cases consolidated in Branzburg."
III. THE SHIELD LAW ALTERNATIVE
In 1896 Maryland became the first state to grant a statutory tes-
timonial privilege to reporters." The privilege was designed to
"' See id. at 690. Justice White, writing for the majority, stated: "We are asked to create
another [constitutional privilege] by interpreting the First Amendment to grant newsmen a
testimonial privilege that other citizens do not enjoy. This we decline to do." Id. (White, J.,
joined by Burger, C.J., Blackmun & Rehnquist, J.J.). See also id. at 708 (if there is no first
amendment privilege for newsmen, then they have no privilege to refuse to appear before
a grand jury). Justice Powell wrote a concurrence and Justices Douglas and Stewart wrote
dissents. Justices Brennan and Marshall joined in Stewart's dissent. Id. at 709, 711, 725.
" Id. at 709. Justice Powell, in his concurrence, stressed the "limited nature of the
Court's holding", stating that: "The Court does not hold that newsmen, subpoenaed to
testify before a grand jury, are without constitutional rights with respect to the gathering
of news or in safe-guarding their sources." Id. For characteristic readings and effective
usage of Powell's concurrence see Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 784 (2d Cir. 1972)
(situation might require that the duty to testify yield to first amendment values), cert. de-
nied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); Apicella v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 78, 83
(E.D.N.Y. 1975). See also Comment, supra note 27, at 171-72 (majority laid the foundation
for recognition of qualified first amendment privilege, although it held that privilege did
not apply in cases before it). But ef. Marcus, supra note 31, at 829-31 (Powell's concurrence
is both strange and confusing); Morse & Zuker, supra note 29, § 8.05 at 419 (Powell's
"enigmatic" concurring opinion).
"" Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). Each of the cases consolidated for review in
Branzburg involved issuance of grand jury subpoenas in furtherance of investigations into
criminal activity; activity not only about which news had been published, but activity actu-
ally witnessed by the newsmen involved. Id. at 667-79.
See Lightman v. State, 15 Md. App. 713, 294 A.2d 149, affd per curiam, 266 Md. 550,
295 A.2d 212 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 951 (1973). The original Maryland statute first
appeared in Chapter 249 of the Acts of 1896. Id. at 294 A.2d at 153 n.3. As the statute did
not protect those engaged in "radio or television news broadcasting" the Maryland legisla-
ture later provided such protection in Chapter 614 of the Acts of 1949. Id. See Tofani v.
State, 297 Md. 165, 465 A.2d 413 (1983). The impetus behind enactment of Maryland's
first shield law was an incident which occurred in 1896. Id. at 169, 465 A.2d at 415. A
reporter for the Baltimore Sun printed an article containing confidential information
which was concurrently before a Baltimore City grand jury investigating official corruption.
Id. The article suggested that certain officials had been bribed by the owners of illegal
gambling establishments. Id. The grand jury, suspecting a leak, summoned the reporter
and demanded that he disclose the source of his information. Id. The reporter refused and
was jailed for five days- the remaining duration of the grand jury's term. Id. The Maryland
General Assembly enacted the shield law in response to lobbying efforts by the city's Jour-
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protect reporters from compulsory disclosure of their sources in
judicial and legislative proceedings."' Today, such shield laws have
been enacted in over half of the states," reflecting a legislative
intent to expand the limited protection afforded the media under
common law and constitutional doctrine.47 Although diverse in
nalists' Club; the club had been distressed both by the jailing of the reporter and at the
prospect of journalists having to reveal their confidential sources. Id. See also Bortz &
Bortz, "Pressing" Out The Wrinkles In Maryland's Shield Law For Journalists, 8 U. BALT. L.
REV. 461, 461 (1979) (Maryland's statute was the nation's first shield law).
, See Bortz & Bortz, supra note 44, at 462 n. 10. The original Maryland Shield Law read:
No person engaged in, connected with or employed on a newspaper or journal
shall be compelled to disclose, in any legal proceeding or trial or before any commit-
tee of the legislature or elsewhere, the source of any news or information procured
or obtained by him for and published in the newspaper on and in which he is en-
gaged, connected with or employed.
Id. The current version of Maryland's shield law is included in the Maryland Code of
Courts and Judicial Proceedings. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-112 (1984). The
drafting of shield law statutes is diverse with respect to the designated proceedings in
which they may be invoked; however, their coverage is generally broad. See, e.g., ALA. CODE
§ 12-21-142 (1986). The journalist is protected "in any legal proceeding or trial, before
any court or before a grand jury of any court, before the presiding officer of any tribunal
or his agent or agents or before any committee of the legislature or elsewhere .... " Id.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-902 (1987). The journalist "may not be adjudged in contempt by
a judicial, legislative, administrative, or any other body having the power to issue subpoe-
nas ..... Id.
In accord with the design of its original law, Maryland's present-day shield law protects
only the source of information rather than the information itself. See Morse & Zuker, supra
note 29, § 8.08, at 425 n.107.
11 ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.150-.220 (1983); Atiz REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12-2237 (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1977); CAL EVID. CODE § 1070 (West
Supp. 1987); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320-26 (1974); IiL ANN. STAT. ch. 110 paras. 8-
901 to -909 (Smith-Hurd 1984 & Supp. 1987-1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-3-5-1 (West
1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1972); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
45:1451-:1454 (West 1982); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-112 (1984); MICs4. STAT.
ANN. § 28.945(1) (Callaghan 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 595.021-.025 (West Supp. 1986-
1987); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1-901 to -903 (1987); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-144 to -147
(1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.275 (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21 to -21.9 (West
Supp. 1987-1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-7 (Supp. 1987); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h
(McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1976); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 2739.04-.12 (Page 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506 (West 1980); OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 44.510-.540 (1981); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942 (Purdon 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 9-19.1-1 to .3 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (1980).
, See Ex parte Lawrence, 116 Cal. 298, 300, 48 P. 124, 125 (1897) ("It cannot be suc-
cessfully contended, and has not been seriously argued, that the witnesses were justified in
refusing to give these names upon the ground that the communication was privileged.");
Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 82, 70 S.E. 781, 785 (1911) (newspaper reporter cannot
claim privilege of confidentiality); In re Grunrow, 84 N.J.L. 235, 236, 85 A. 1011, 1012
(1913) (the reporter "pleaded a privilege which finds no countenance in the law. Such an
immunity . would be far-reaching in its effect and detrimental to the due administration
of law."): People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff of New York County, 269 N.Y. 291, 295, 199
N.E. 415, 416 (1936) ("[tlhe tendency is not to extend the classes to whom the privilege
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their protective coverage,'8 shield laws are generally recognized as
balancing the interest which a democratic society has in the free
flow of news and information with its interest in the evidentiary
process necessary to the administration of justice." Thus, it is not
surprising that serious debate has attended both the passage60 and
from disclosure is granted, but to restrict that privilege."); Clein v. State, 52 So. 2d 117,
120 (Fla. 1950) ("Members of the journalistic profession do not enjoy the privilege of con-
fidential communication, as between themselves and their informants ....").
It was not until 1970 that the judiciary was receptive to a privilege for the press based
upon the first amendment. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. See also United States
v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1980) (television network partially protected by first
amendment privilege against subpoena requesting outtakes and other materials pertaining
to criminal investigation); cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981). See generally Beaver, The News-
man's Code, The Claim of Privilege and Everyman's Right to Evidence, 47 OR. L. REV. 243
(1968); Guest & Stanzler, supra note 29, at 18; Morse & Zucker, supra note 29. §§ 8.01-.06
at 408.
" See Marcus, supra note 31, at 859-67 (overview of varied characteristics of state shield
laws); Morse & Zucker, supra note 29, § 8.08, at 425 (construction of shield laws can vary
significantly); see generally Note & Comment, Privileged Communications- News Media- A
"Shield Statute"for Oregon?, 46 OR. L. REv. 99 (1966) (comparative analysis of model shield
law for Oregon proposed by state newspaper association).
"' See Note & Comment, supra note 48, at 107. One commentator succinctly summarized
the balancing issue as follows: -"[The decision whether to enact a shield statute is ulti-
mately made by resolving two competing values, viz., (1) efficient and effective administra-
tion of the search for truth, and (2) maximizing the amount of information available to the
public." Id. Legislatures enact shield laws when they determine the public interest in infor-
mation outweighs the need for full disclosure. See Maressa v. New Jersey Monthly, 89 N.J.
176, 184, 445 A.2d 376, 380 ("The Legislature enacts such privileges 'because in the par-
ticular area concerned, they are regarded as serving a more important public interest than
the need for full disclosure,'" (quoting State v. Briley, 53 N.J. 498, 506, 251 A.2d 442,
446 (1969))), cert denied, 459 U.S. 907 (1982).
The Nebraska Legislature weighed these interests when it drafted the state's Free Flow of
Information Act. Nna. REV. STAT. § 20-144 (1983). It commences with six short paragraphs
which set forth a legislative finding on the need to encourage the free flow of news. Id.
However, shield laws will give way when a defendant's constitutional rights are in jeopardy.
See In re McAuley, 63 Ohio App. 2d 5, 20, 408 N.E.2d 697, 708 (1979) ("Inasmuch as the
shield law was in conflict with the Sixth Amendment . . .the court concluded that in the
interests of justice and under the present facts, the shield law must yield.").
" See Bortz & Bortz, supra note 44, at 462. Dean Wigmore was greatly dismayed at the
enactment of the Maryland shield law, calling it " 'as detestable in substance as it is crude
in form,' " noting that " 'for more than three centuries, it has been recognized as a funda-
mental maxim that the public is entitled to every man's evidence.' " Id. Wigmore wrongly
predicted that the Maryland statute would '" 'remain unique.'" Id. See also 8 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 25, § 2286, at 533-34 (confidential communication to journalist not privileged).
Maryland remained alone in affording protection to journalists for thirty-seven years until
1933, when New Jersey enacted a similar statute. See Note, The Right of a Newsman to Re-
frain from Divulging the Sources of His Information, 36 VA. L. REV. 61, 61 n.1 (1950).
New York first considered, but failed to pass, a shield statute in 1949. See Guest & Stan-
zler, supra note 29, at 21 n. 14. See also New York Law Revision Commission Report and
Study Relating to Problems Involved in Conferring Upon Newspapermen a Privilege
Which Would Legally Protect Them from Divulging Sources of Information Given to
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subsequent judicial administration of state shield laws.8 1
A. Comparison and Overview
The legislatures of the majority of states providing shield law
protection have included in their statutes some form of equivocat-
ing language by which the press is accountable under certain cir-
cumstances. 8' In fact, as many as eleven states provide that shield
law protection may be overcome upon specified findings, usually
ascertained upon a balancing test.8 Generally, the privilege is
Them: The Journalist's Privilege to Withhold the Source of His News, [1949] N.Y. LAW
REV. COMM'N REP. 33 (thorough examination of relative benefits and detriments attending
such a privilege).
0' See generally Note, supra note 13, at 748 (approving of broad judicial construction of
state shield law); see also Comment, Branzburg v. Hayes: A Need for Statutory Protection of
News Sources, 61 Ky. L.J. 551, 557-58 (1973) (discussion of varied judicial applications of
state shield laws); Comment, Journalist's Privilege: In re Farber and the New Jersey Shield
Law, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 545, 573 (1979) (state shield law should be redrafted and
strengthened in view of judicial hostility to newsmen's assertion of privilege).
Some commentators have questioned the underlying wisdom of shield law legislation. See
Bortz & Bortz, supra note 44, at 462. See also Note, Constitutional Law- Freedom of the Press-
Right of News Media Personnel to Refuse to Disclose Confidential Sources of Information, 61 MIcH4.
L. REV. 184, 191 (1962) ("extensions of first amendment freedoms for purely economic
advantage is -dangerous, and unwise"). Other commentators have questioned the design of
particular statutes. See Note, Newsperson's Privilege and the New York State Shield Law: A Pro-
posal, 43 ALB. L. REV. 918, 927 (1979) ("New York's shield law is too limited in scope and
uncertain in application."); Note, The Newsgatherer's Shield-Why Waste Space in the California
Constitution?, 15 Sw. U.L. REV. 527, 538 (1985) (California shield law is textually ambiguous;
does not create privilege but merely provides immunity from contempt).
82 See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
U3 See ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.160(b)(1)(2) (1983) (balancing test may revoke privilege if
failure to disclose shown to cause miscarriage of justice, denial of fair trial or is contrary to
public interest); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1977) (no privilege if shown material "was writ-
ten, published or broadcast in bad faith, with malice and not in the interest of public wel-
fare."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4323(a) (1974) (privilege may be lost in balancing public
interest against relevance of information sought, alternative sources, and effect disclosure
would have on flow of news); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 8-903, -904, -907 (Smith-Hurd
1984 & Supp. 1987-1988) (balancing test may allow granting petition to revoke privilege;
petition must state specific public interest harmed if information is not disclosed); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 45-1453 (West 1982) (privilege revoked if disclosure is essential to public
interest); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.024 Subd. 2(1), (2), (3) (West Supp. 1986-1987) (excep-
tion to privilege if disclosure is necessary to prevent injustice; in balancing must be shown
that information is relevant to violation of law and unavailable from other sources); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 38-6-7(A) (Supp. 1987) (privilege not available if "essential to prevent injus-
tice."); N.D CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1976) (no privilege if failure to disclose will cause
miscarriage of justice); OKIA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 2506(B)(2) (West 1980) (privilege may be
lost if disclosure shown to be relevant to issue in the action and not available from alterna-
tive source); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19.1-3(c) (1985) (no privilege if information necessary to
felony prosecution or to prevent threat to human life); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208(c)(1)
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overcome if it is found that failure to disclose the information
sought would either lead to an unjust result or be harmful to the
public interest." Moreover, recognizing that libel plaintiffs may
suffer at the hands of broad shield law coverage, 55 six states have
incorporated provisions to restrict their statutes accordingly."
Such libel provisions range from shifting the burden of proof to
the party invoking the privilege, 57 to complete revocation when a
defense is based upon privileged information or sources.58 In ac-
cord with the common law doctrine on privileges, as many as
seven shield laws have either been expressly drafted 9 or judicially
interpreted to allow for waiver upon the prior disclosure of privi-
leged information." Finally, the judiciary of two states have re-
quired that invocation of shield law protection be subject to a bal-
ancing test.61
(1980) (three-part balancing test requires showing that public interest requires disclosure).
" See supra note 53.
"See, e.g., Coughlin v. Westinghouse Broadcasting & Cable, Inc., 780 F.2d 349, 349 (3d
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2927 (1986). See also Maressa v. New Jersey Monthly, 89
N.J. 176, 202-03, 445 A.2d 376, 390 (Schreiber, J., dissenting) (majority's rigid interpreta-
tion of state shield law in effect eliminates "cause of action for defamation" where public
figure is involved), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 907 (1982); Hatchard v. Westinghouse Broadcast-
ing Co., 532 A.2d 346, 349 (Pa. 1987) (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania noted that exces-
sive shield law protection may make it impossible for defamation plaintiff to prove his
case).
"See ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 110 para. 8-903(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987-1988) (plaintiff
may apply for order revoking privilege in libel cases); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45-1454 (West
1982) (in defamation action burden of proof is on reporter if he claims privilege); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 595.025 (West Supp. 1986-1987) (privilege unavailable where plaintiff can
show disclosure will lead to evidence of actual malice); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §
2506(B)(2) (West 1980) (no privilege in defamation action when defense is based on con-
tent or source of privileged information); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 919.1-3(b)(1) (1985) (no privi-
lege when defamation defense based on source of privileged information); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 24-1-208(b) (1980) (same); cf. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1977) (privilege unavailable if
material published with malice).
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 1454 (West 1982).
SR.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19.1-3(b)(1) (1985).
MoNr. CODE ANiN. § 26-1-903(2) (1987) (newsman's voluntary offer of information to
grand jury or other official body waives privilege); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (West
Supp. 1987-88) (New Jersey shield law may be waived pursuant to Rule 37); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 9-19.1-3(a) (1985) (privilege does not apply to information already made public).
" See Lexington Herald-Leader Co. v. Beard, 690 S.W.2d 374, 375 n.l (Ky. 1984);
Tofani v. State, 297 Md. 165, 173, 465 A.2d 413, 417 (1983); Newburn v. Howard
Hughes Medical Inst., 95 Nev. 368, 371-72, 594 P.2d 1146, 1148-49 (1979); State v. Geis,
2 Ohio App. 3d 258, 262, 441 N.E.2d 803, 809 (1981) (privilege waived only to extent of
information disclosed).
11 See Lexington Herald-Leader Co., 690 S.W.2d at 379 (Supreme Court of Kentucky sub-
scribed to balancing test notwithstanding state shield law); In re McAuley, 63 Ohio App. 2d
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B. Confidentiality and Shield Laws
With the exception of Rhode Island,62 no state shield law ex-
pressly requires confidentiality.18 Moreover, no statute whatsoever
expressly protects sources and information that are nonconfiden-
tial." Several states have judicially construed their shield laws as
applicable both to confidential and nonconfidential information,"6
while three states, now including New York, confine the privilege
to sources and information acquired in confidence.6" A review of
existing case law from jurisdictions that have yet to rule directly
on the issue reveals an ostensible understanding of press privilege
as applicable to sources and information obtained in confidence. 67
5, 22, 408 N.E.2d 697, 709 (1979) (newsperson's privilege is qualified and subject to bal-
ancing test; "state shield laws do not provide an absolute right.
" See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19.1-2 (1985).
" See supra note 46 (of twenty-six statutes, Rhode Island has the only statute which ex-
pressly refers to confidential information in conferring the privilege). However, a require-
ment of confidentiality may be strongly inferred from policy statements included in certain
statutes. See, e.g., ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 8-907 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987) (libel provi-
sion weighs public interest in disclosure against newsman's confidential source). See also
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.022 (West Supp. 1986-1987) (public policy rationale is to protect
confidential relationship); cf. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4322 (1974) (privilege designed to
protect "an express or implied understanding").
" See supra note 46 (no statute on its face covers nonconfidential sources and
information).
" See Hammarley v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 388, 397, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608, 613
(1979) (applies to all information acquired by a newsman); Tofani v. State, 297 Md. 165,
174 n.2, 465 A.2d 413, 418 n.2 (1983) (confidentiality not a prerequisite); Grand Forks
Herald v. District Court, 322 N.W.2d 850, 854 (N.D. 1982) (privilege not limited to confi-
dential sources); Austin v. Memphis Publishing Co., 655 S.W.2d 146, 149-50 (Tenn. 1983)
(court finds legislature considered but rejected requirement of confidentiality). But cf.
Hatchard v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 532 A.2d 346 (Pa. 1987) (state Supreme
Court reverses lower court decision which held nonconfidential media outtakes privileged
under state's shield law).
" See supra note 21 and accompanying text. See also Newburn v. Howard Hughes Medi-
cal Inst., 95 Nev. 368, 372, 594 P.2d 1146, 1149 (1979); R.I. GENi. LAWS § 9-19.1-2 (1985).
" See Bartlett v. Superior Court, 150 Ariz. 178, 183, 722 P.2d 346, 351 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1986) (Arizona court construes statute as protecting against disclosure of "confidential
sources"); Subpoena Duces Tecum to Stearns v. Zulka, 489 N.E.2d 146, 149 (Ind. Ct. App.
3d Dist. 1986) (in dictum, court stated that shield law provides "absolute privilege against
revealing confidential sources. ... ); In re Burns, 484 So. 2d 658, 659 (La. 1986) (shield
law protects identity of "confidential source of information" as well as information which
might lead to his identity); Sible v. Lee Enters., Inc., 729 P.2d 1271, 1276 (Mont. 1986)
(Hunt, J., concurring) (shield law protects "disclosure of sources and confidential informa-
tion" (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-902 (Media Confidentiality Act))), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 3242 (1987); Resorts Int'l, Inc. v. NJM Assocs., 89 N.J. 212, 215, 445 A.2d 395, 396
(shield law protects "sources, editorial processes and other confidential information ...."),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 907 (1982); In re McAuley, 63 Ohio App. 2d 5, 22, 408 N.E.2d 697,
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Case Against a First Amendment Privilege
In Knight-Ridder, the court of appeals cited Justice Powell's con-
currence in Branzburg as the criterion by which it weighed and
rejected the petitioner's claim to a qualified constitutional privi-
lege." By so doing, the court of appeals lent credence to the pre-
mise implicit in Powell's concurrence that courts may find within
the first amendment a qualified evidentiary privilege for the
press.6 It is submitted that reliance upon Justice Powell's concur-
rence is misplaced. It is suggested that the better view is that of
the Branzburg plurality: that the press has no testimonial privilege,
qualified or unqualified, under the first amendment.
Testimonial privileges were established at common law. 70 Addi-
tional privileges have been established both judicially and by statu-
tory enactment.7 1 Arguably, privileges created in this manner are
709 (1979) (shield law does "not provide an absolute right not to provide the name of a
confidential informant."); Taylor v. Miskovsky, 640 P.2d 959, 961-62 (Okla. 1981) (court's
rationale framed in language of confidentiality).
The commentators clearly manifest an understanding that the debate is a priori about
confidential sources and information. See Beaver, supra note 47, at 245; Guest & Stanzler,
supra note 29, at 18; Marcus, supra note 31, at 815; O'Neil, supra note 33, at 515; Com-
ment, supra note 29, at 331; Note & Comment, supra note 48, at 101. See also Comment,
Newsman's Privilege Two Years After Branzburg v. Hayes: The First Amendment in Jeopardy, 49
TUL L. Rav. 417, 418 n.7 (1975) (American Newspaper Guild Code of Newsmen's Ethics
specifically refers to confidential sources and information.).
a See Knight-Ridder Broadcasting, Inc. v. Greenberg, 70 N.Y.2d 151, 160, 511 N.E.2d
1116, 1121, 518 N.Y.S.2d 595, 600 (1987) (the information sought was both relevant and
unavailable from alternative sources (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 710
(1972)))..
" See supra note 42 and accompanying text. An alternative tactic used by courts to find a
first amendment privilege has been to distinguish Branzburg. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 437 (10th Cir. 1977) ("The actual problem in that case was whether a
reporter was free to avoid altogether a grand jury subpoena." (distinguishing Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972))); Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 784 (2d Cir. 1972)
("Branzburg v. Hayes... involving as it did ... a grand jury investigating criminal activi-
ties, is only of tangential relevance to this case."), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); see also
Loadholtz v. Fields, 389 F. Supp. 1299, 1301 (M.D. Fla. 1975); State v. St. Peter, 132 Vt.
266, 269, 315 A.2d 254, 255 (1974).
Notwithstanding Branzburg, more recent decisions have indicated a willingness to grant a
first amendment journalist's privilege in the realm of criminal cases. See United States v.
Burke, 700 F.2d 70 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816 (1983); United States v. Cuthbert-
son, 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981).
"0 See supra note 25.
"' See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 16, § 76.2, at 180-81. Legislatures are better suited to
the task of evaluating the need for new privileges because they have no immediate interest,
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subject to repeal. It is submitted that a constitutional press privi-
lege, whether qualified or unqualified, would be a privilege above
all others7 and unrepealable. Its effect would be to usurp the le-
gitimate right of states and state courts to prescribe their own evi-
dentiary rules.73 Proponents of the privilege have often framed
their arguments in the language of "news gathering;" a special
right reserved to the press under the constitution, threatened by
the compulsory disclosure of confidential sources.7' Yet, no privi-
lege ought rest upon professional standing"5 when it is rooted in a
as does the judiciary, in the effects of privileges vis-a-vis the litigation process. Id. Cf. C.
LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1987). The federal courts ob-
serve privileges in accord with the common law as interpreted by the courts of the United
States. Id. § 9.2, at 384. Additionally, the Federal Rules of Evidence permit the judicial
development of privileges. Id. at 385. However, in diversity cases in which a civil action
involves a state law claim or defense, privileges are governed by state law. Id. at 384-85.
The Advisory Committee's Note to section 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence indicates
that federal courts are to address the issue of privilege " 'in the light of reason and experi-
ence.'" (quoting the Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure). See FED. R.
EvID. 501.
7' Cf. Knight-Ridder Broadcasting, Inc. v. Greenberg, 70 N.Y.2d 151, 163, 511 N.E.2d
1116, 1123, 518 N.Y.S.2d 595, 602 (1987) (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). The Knight-Ridder
dissent argued that, indeed, New York's press privilege statute was unique insofar as it was
contained in the New York Civil Rights Law and was a "statutory enactment of the State
and the Federal constitutional protections of a free press." Id. (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
The dissent pointed up that certain other privilege statutes are contained in New York's
evidence code. Id.
" Cf. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 308 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). "I
would have considerable difficulty in subscribing to the Court's further constitutionaliza-
tion of the intricacies of the common law of evidence." Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The
constitutionalization of any evidentiary rule necessarily weakens the integrity of a federalist
system. Cf. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 171 (1970) (Burger, CJ., concurring) (state
sovereignty must be respected when states enact rules of evidence in the area of criminal
justice).
See Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 89 N.M. 307, 309, 551 P.2d 1354, 1356
(1976) ("There can be no real question about rules of privilege being rules of evidence ...
."). The Supreme Court of New Mexico struck down its state's shield law as violative of a
state constitutional provision prohibiting the legislature from creating rules of practice and
procedure by statute. Id. at 312, 551 P.2d at 1358.
7" See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682 (1972) ("We are admonished that refusal
to provide a First Amendment reporter's privilege will undermine the freedom of the press
to collect and disseminate news."); Sigma Delta Chi v. Speaker, 270 Md. 1, 310 A.2d 156
(1973) (journalism fraternity and news reporter contend prohibition against tape recording
in legislative chambers violates first amendment right to gather news); State v. Buchanan,
250 Or. 244, 247, 436 P.2d 729, 730 (reporter contends that freedom of the press implies
the freedom to gather news), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968).
"" See Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132 (1937) ("The publisher of a newspa-
per has no special immunity from the application of general laws."); Buchanan, 250 Or. at
248-49, 436 P.2d 729 at 731 ("[lIt would be difficult to rationalize . . . special constitu-
tional rights for those possessing credentials as newsgatherers ...."), cert. denied, 392 U.S.
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right of access to information which, in any coherent first amend-
ment scheme, must apply equally to all citizens." Furthermore,
freedom of the press should not confer an unqualified exemption
from the fundamental duty to account for that which is
published."
Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote that "the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market. ' 7' Today, this market is saturated by modern me-
905 (1968); see also Beaver, supra note 47, at 249 (a right of access for special class is
discriminatory); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.19, at 886
(3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL LAW]. "The Court thus far has refused to draw
any constitutional distinction between speech and the press, or the 'institutional press,' or
the 'organized media,' in part, perhaps, because there is no principled way of doing so." Id.
Cf. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (freedom to publish is not
confined to a special class of professionals); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938)
("The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily em-
braces pamphlets and leaflets.").
" See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 684-85 (press has no elevated right of access); Tribune
Review Publishing Co. v. Thomas, 254 F.2d 883, 884-85 (3d Cir. 1958) (no right of access
to information not available td the public (quoting Judge Fuld in United Press Ass'ns v.
Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 77, 123 N.E.2d 777, 778 (1954))); cf. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-
17 (1965) ("The right to speak and to publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right
to gather information.").
" See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). "It is a fundamental principle,
long established, that the freedom of speech and of the press, which is secured by the
constitution, does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish without responsibility
..... Id. See also 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 151-52 (1966) (as stated by Blackstone,
if a man "publishes what is improper, mischievous or illegal, he must take the conse-
quences of his own temerity."), quoted in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713-14 (1931).
See THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE Vol. IV, app. J, at 475 (M. Conway ed. 1969). In
1806 Thomas Paine wrote, in response to the remarks of Jefferson, that "nothing is more
common with printers . . . than the continual reply of Liberty of the Press, as if because
they are printers they have more privileges than other people." Id. Paine took exception to
Jefferson's remark, made while Jefferson was Minister at Paris, that 'the licentiousness of
the press produces the same effect as the restraint of the press .... " Id. Paine contended
that liberty of the press was properly traced to the abolition of official censorship; "in Eng-
land, called Imprimateur . . . [Alnd as works could then be published without first ob-
taining the permission of the government office, the press was . . . said to be free." Id.
Paine had been in France and observed there the "terrible effects of personal libels
shielded under the liberty of press." Id. at n. 1.
For authority that Jefferson understood liberty of the press to be qualified see W. BERNS,
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 81-86 (1976). Moreover,
although under the influence of Oliver Wendell Holmes and Zachariah Chafee, Jr., the
notion came to be accepted that the Framers had abolished the law of seditious libel by
adoption of the first amendment, there is evidence to the contrary. See id. at 83 (citing L.
LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY
(1960)); see also CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 75, § 16.5, at 833.
" Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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dia.7 But, without accountability there can be no "test". It is sug-
gested that the discerning of truth within the market necessarily
implies the duty to account for what is written. Privilege-as ex-
emption from accountability based upon status-denudes the first
amendment of its proper role in a democratic scheme.8" In
Branzburg, Justice White recognized the problematic nature of
constitutional "categories" and declined "to embark the judiciary
on a long and difficult journey to such an uncertain destination. '
It is suggested that whatever need there is for a press privilege, it
is properly fulfilled and measured by the legislature.
B. The Proper Scope of Shield Laws
In Knight-Ridder, the issue was whether the New York Shield
Law covered nonconfidential information. In New York, dating
as far back as 1828, the vast majority of privilege statutes have not
contained express references to confidentiality," yet have been
construed to require it.84 It is submitted that the Knight-Ridder
' See Broadcasting-Cablecasting Yearbook 1987, at A2. There are currently 1,285 VHF,
UHF and non-commercial stations operating in the United States. Id. See also Statistical
Abstract of the United States 1987, at 536. There are currently 9,144 newspapers in the
United States, including dailies, weeklies and semi-weeklies. Id.
80 Cf. State v. Buchanan, 250 Or. 244, 249, 456 P.2d 729, 731 (such a privilege would be
"destructive of the very freedom that is sought to be preserved. ... ), cert. denied, 392
U.S. 905 (1968).
" Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 703 (1972). Justice White recognized that applying
a constitutional privilege for the media would be difficult to administer as it would require
the court to determine which media entities were entitled to the privilege. Id. at 704. Fur-
thermore, having to decide each case on an "ad hoc" basis would not serve the media's
interest in securing their sources of information. Id. at 702, n.37.
"2 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
63 See Brief for Respondent at 7-11, 28, Knight-Ridder Broadcasting, Inc. v. Greenberg,
70 N.Y.2d 151, 511 N.E.2d 1116, 518 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1987) (No. 86-2643). In 1828, New
York was the first state to establish a statutory physician-patient privilege (citing W. RICH-
ARDSON, RICHARDSON ON EvIDENCE § 426, at 419 U. Prince 10th ed. 1973)). The statute did
not expressly state its application to confidential communications. Id. at 7. Thereafter,
most privilege statutes in New York were uniform in failing to make reference to confiden-
tiality. Id. at 28. Cf. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. §§ 4503-05, 08 (McKinney Supp. 1987). Statu-
tory privileges for the attorney, physician, dentist and nurse, clergy, and social worker all
make reference to confidentiality. Id.
" See Brief for Respondent at 10, Knight-Ridder Broadcasting, Inc. v. Greenberg, 70
N.Y.2d 151, 511 N.E.2d 1116, 518 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1987) (No. 86-2643) (citing Bauman v.
Steingester, 213 N.Y. 328, 333, 107 N.E. 578, 579 (1915) (confidentiality interpreted to be
a requirement of physician-patient and attorney-client privilege in the 1876 Code of Reme-
dial Justice)).
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court ruled in accordance with this practice and properly inter-
preted the shield law's legislative history." Furthermore, it is sug-
gested that the proper scope of shield law protection has clearly
not been, and should not be, absolute or unqualified, but should
be constrained to the protection of sources and information ac-
quired in confidence. Moreover, existing empirical data gauging
the harmful effects of compulsory disclosure on the flow of news
and information is highly tenuous.86 It is urged that shield laws
" See Governor's Memorandum, (N.Y.A. 5478-B, 193rd Sess.), reprinted in [1970] N.Y.
LEGIs. ANN. 508. The Governor's memorandum reads in pertinent part: "[Siources of in-
formation have been cut off because of recent attempts by the Federal Government to
require the disclosure of information obtained by reporters in confidence." (emphasis
added). Id. See Ch. 615 [1970] N.Y. Laws (Governor's Bill Jacket). The Bill Jacket contains
a letter written by Oxie Reichler--editor emeritus of the Yonkers Herald Statesman, for-
merly president of the New York State Society of Newspaper Editors-in support of pro-
posed federal shield law legislation. d. It refers consistently to confidential sources (empha-
sis added). Id. See Ch. 316 [1975] N.Y. Laws (Governor's Bill Jacket) (Budget Report on
Bills, No.4(b) states in support of shield law 1975 amendment that "representatives of the
press [will] not have to divulge their confidential sources .... "(emphasis added)). See also
N.Y.S. 3553, N.Y.A. 4547 204 Sess. (1981). The original study bill draft for the 1981
amendment to the shield law would have affirmatively removed any requirement of confi-
dentiality. Id. But see N.Y.S. 3553B, N.Y.A. 4547, 204 Sess. (1981). That provision, as well
as many others which would have broadened the scope of the shield law, did not survive
the legislative process and was not contained in the amendment finally signed into law. Id.
All four New York Appellate Divisions have construed the shield law as applicable to
confidential sources and information. See In re Pennzoil Co., 108 App. Div. 2d 666, 485
N.Y.S.2d 533 (1st Dep't 1985); Hennigan v. Buffalo Courier Express Co., 85 App. Div. 2d
924, 446 N.Y.S.2d 767 (4th Dep't 1981); People v. Le Grand, 67 App. Div. 2d 446, 415
N.Y.S.2d 252 (2d Dep't 1979); WBAI-FM v. Proskin, 42 App. Div. 2d 5, 344 N.Y.S.2d 393
(3d Dep't 1973).
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 694-95 n.32. The court in Branzburg found that: "Estimates of
the inhibiting effect of such subpoenas on the willingness of informants to make disclosures
to newsmen are widely divergent and to a great extent speculative." (citing survey included
in Guest & Stanzler, supra note 29, at 57-61). Id. Cf. Guest & Stanzler, supra note 29, at 43.
In view of their survey, the authors themselves write: "[N]ewspapers do run a large num-
ber of stories based on material from informants." Id. However, notwithstanding their sur-
vey, the authors are primarily in accord with Justice White in Branzburg when attempting
to draw conclusions regarding the effects of compulsory disclosure: "We simply cannot mea-
sure the effect on informants." Id. at 44. In writing of the pressures imposed upon news-
men, and a possible "chilling effect" due to sanctions which may be imposed upon them for
refusing compulsory disclosure, the authors surmise: "Nevertheless, the present effect on
newsmen probably is not great." Id. at 46.
See Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MicH. L. REv. 229, 246-51
(1971). In attempting to reveal the media's reliance upon confidential sources through the
use of numerical and percentage tables, the author commences his analysis with the caveat
that "[t]he extent of reliance on confidential sources cannot be quantified with any degree oJ
precision .... " (emphasis added). Id. at 246. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 694 n.33 (Court
cites study conducted by professor Blasi on press subpoenas indicating only 8% of 975 re-
porters surveyed could "say with some certainty that [they]... had been adversely affected
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should be drafted not only to apply expressly to confidential
sources and information, but also to include provisions under
which the privilege may be overcome under appropriate circum-
stances. Such construction would properly recognize the element
of balanced accountability which the New York Shield Law pres-
ently lacks.
V. REMAINING QUESTIONS
It is contended by some that the privilege of the press is unlike
any other; it neither exists for, nor resides with, the utterer-it
belongs solely to the journalist."' Yet, if the proposed purpose of
shield laws is to facilitate the flow of news by ensuring anonymity
and safety for sources,88 of what inducement can it be to those
sources when they find that their privilege to remain anonymous
rests not with them but with their media contact, who may, of his
own choice, reveal their identities? It is suggested that it is ques-
tionable whether a privilege, so explained, exists for the legiti-
by the threat of subpoena ...." (citing Blasi, Press Subpoenas: An Empirical and Legal Analy-
sis, Study Report of the Reporters' Committee on Freedom of the Press 6-12)); see also Beaver,
supra note 47, at 251-52 (effects of divulging sources extremely difficult to measure); cf.
Comment, The Newsman's Privilege After Branzburg v. Hayes: Whither Now?, 64 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 218, 231 (1973) (contention by opponents of press privilege that the "pau-
city" of cases generated by the debate indicates that the effects of disclosure are negligible
is unwarranted). Indeed, a review of the annotated statutes of the twenty-six states with
shield laws reveals that, but for a few choice "media" jurisdictions, shield laws are margin-
ally litigated at best. See supra note 46.
87 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 695. The Court stated that the "privilege claimed is that of
the reporter, not the informant .... " Id. See also Hestand v. State, 257 Ind. 191, 192-93,
273 N.E.2d 282, 283 (1971) ("creates a right personal to the reporter ... which only he
can invoke."); Lipps v. State, 254 Ind. 141, 146, 258 N.E. 2d 622, 626 (1970) (same); State
v. Boiardo, 83 N.J. 350, 361, 416 A.2d 793, 798 (1980) (privilege is that of the newsperson
and not the source); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 16, § 76.2, at 185 (privilege belongs solely
to journalist).
" See, e.g., Guest & Stanzler, supra note 29, at 45 n.138. It has proved difficult to logi-
cally explain the newsman's privilege: as stated by Guest & Stanzler, the purpose "is not to
protect the source, although that is a secondary effect, but to promote the flow of news."
Id. Cf. Hestand, 257 Ind. at 192-93, 273 N.E.2d at 283. A defendant who confessed his
guilt to a newsman could not prevent the newsman from testifying; the privilege belonged
to the journalist, not the defendant. Id. See also United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d
139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981). The court stated that the news-
man's privilege belonged to the newsman and that the right to waive it could be exercised
only by him- not by potential witnesses. Id.
It has been contended that shield laws change the flow of news marginally, if at all,
because informants are unaware of such statutes. See Beaver, supra note 47, at 251-52.
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mate aims of news gathering or to facilitate an exemption from
accountability.
The years following Branzburg brought a growth of investiga-
tive journalism such has not been previously seen.8 9 Of late, the
wisdom of reliance upon confidential sources has been called into
question.' 0 It has been suggested that reliance upon confidential
sources "is more the sort of thing reporters try to do than
sources;" the contention being that, although it may facilitate
news gathering, it leads as well to lazy journalism and inaccu-
racy."1 Recent libel cases of prominence" have revealed, through
the required disclosure of outtakes, the sometimes embarrassing
and highly questionable tactics" used by the press in obtaining
" See Leslie, The Anonymous Source: Second Thoughts on "Deep Throat," WASH. JOUR-
NALISM REv., Sept. 1986, at 33, 34 (after Watergate "a generation of investigative reporters
modeled themselves after Woodward and Bernstein .... "); cf. Kraft, The Imperial Media,
COMMENTARY, May 1981, at 36, 41. Since Watergate "there has been no holding us." Id. at
41. Newsmen assume that "behind every story there is a secret, and that every secret is a
dirty secret." Id.
" See Leslie, supra note 89, at 34. Reliance upon anonymous sources has been excessive
and "the public was growing more skeptical .... " (quoting David Lipman, managing edi-
tor, St. Louis Post-Dispatch). Id. See also Clark, Spies and Whispers: A Tour Through Casey's
CIA (Book Review), Bus. WEEK, Oct. 19, 1987, at 12. The recent publication of Veil by Bob
Woodward has caused "a storm of controversy" over the author's "veracity, ethics land]
judgment .... Id. In Veil, Woodward accuses the late CIA Director of planning a car
bombing which cost eighty lives. Id. at 14. The book is based on 250 anonymous sources
and the author's alleged interviews with the late director, including interviews during his
recovery from brain surgery. Id. at 12-14.
" See Leslie, supra note 89, at 34 (quoting Walter Mears, Executive Editor of the Associ-
ated Press).
" Id. at 35. Cf. Beaver, supra note 47, at 256 (shield law exemption to account for unat-
tributed sources encourages journalistic excess); Note, Constitutional Law-Freedom of the
Press-Right of News Media Personnel to Refuse to Disclose Confidential Sources of Information,
61 MicH. L. REv. 184, 190 (1962) (journalistic claims of privilege used to avoid responsibil-
ity for failure to comply with compulsory disclosure). But cf. Comment, supra note 86, at
231 (shield laws might lead to "greater journalistic excellence .... "); Comment, The Pro-
tection of Confidential News Sources: Enhancing the Utility of Ohio's Shield Law, 42 OHIo ST. L.J.
1039, 1059 (1981) (anonymous informants facilitate reporting of controversial issues).
" See, e.g., Tavoulareas v. Piro, 817 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Sharon v. Time, Inc.,
599 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 97 F.R.D. 703 (S.D.N.Y.
1983). See also Franklin, Suing Media for Libel: A Litigation Study, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RrS. J.
797, 797 n.1 (figures for several prominent multi-million dollar libel judgments indicate
initial judgements are often substantially reduced).
" See Tavoulareas v. Piro, 817 F.2d 762, 829-38 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (MacKinnon, J., dis-
senting). The dissent outlines the pressure placed upon staff reporters by Washington Post
metropolitan editor Bob Woodward to obtain what Woodward termed "'holy shit' stories-
presumably stories so startling that they cause the reader to exclaim in this fashion." Id. at
834 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). As well, Judge MacKinnon pointed up that the investiga-
tive reporter assigned to the Tavoulareas story evidenced a willingness to break the law in
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their stories. Such outtakes are those which the media would have
shield laws protect."
Wigmore feared the unwarranted expansion of statutory privi-
leges arising from the tendency of professional interests to lobby
legislators. 6 It may be suggested that the press has an economic
interest in its privilege97 as well as an interest in its role as the
order to obtain the story he wanted. Id. (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). See also Sharon v.
Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). In Sharon, the court found that there was
sufficient evidence of actual malice on the part of Time to go to the jury. Id. at 584. More-
over, the court admonished Time that it could avoid such litigation if it inquired properly
into the sources of its stories. Id. at 588. See Bedell & Kowet, Anatomy of a Smear: How CBS
Broke the Rules and Got Gen. Westmoreland, TV GUIDE, May 29, 1982, at 3. The two month
investigation by TV Guide into the editorial methods utilized by CBS in putting together
its "documentary" on General Westmoreland entitled The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam De-
ception, revealed, among other things that: CBS began the project convinced of Westmore-
land's guilt and ignored evidence to the contrary. Id. at 4. CBS allowed witnesses sympa-
thetic to the thesis of its "documentary" the opportunity to re-do their "interviews" so that
they would be more persuasive in view of other interviews already on film. Id. The targets
of its "documentary", however, were accorded no such opportunity nor were they permit-
ted to know, before being interviewed, of what they had been accused. Id. See also West-
moreland v. CBS, 97 F.R.D. 703, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (citing TV GUIDE, May 29, 1982).
See Denniston, Settling Lawsuits in Print, WASH. JOURNALIsM REV., Jan.-Feb. 1987, at 16.
Denniston, a reporter for the Baltimore Sun, writes on a seminar given at Yale Law School
by Federal judge Pierre N. Leval, of the Southern District of New York. Id. Leval presided
over the Westmoreland case. Id. Judge Leval noted the embarrassing editorial practices of
Time magazine and the Washington Post which came to light during defamation actions
brought against them by Ariel Sharon and Mobil president, William Tavoulareas, respec-
tively. Id. Judge Leval believes "the press might be willing to give up its 'actual malice'
protection to prevent its internal processes from being revealed." Id.
" Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). In Sharon, Time sought to
invoke the New York shield law. Id. at 582. The court, however, found Time's assertion of
shield law protection particularly disturbing and noted that "shield laws may serve sound
interests in governing the relationship between the courts and the press, but they serve no
sound purpose if used as an excuse for the press to fail to keep its own shops in order." Id.
at 588. See also Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 97 F.R.D. 703, 706-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). In
Westmoreland, CBS claimed that an internal company report evaluating its making of a doc-
umentary concerning General William Westmoreland was protected from disclosure by the
New York shield law as "generated 'in the course of gathering or obtaining news for publi-
cation.'" (construing N.Y. Civ. RIGHTs LAW § 79-h); Id. at 707. Judge Leval rejected the
claim. Id.
The press evinces less concern for first amendment protections and privileges when gov-
ernment officials are required to relinquish their confidential materials. See Kraft, supra,
note 89, at 46. Kraft points up the hypocrisy of The New York Times' opposition to the
decision requiring the Times' reporter, Myron Farber, to turn over his investigative mater-
ials, but on the other hand its enlightened understanding of the balancing of constitutional
interests involved when it came to the Supreme Court's ordering Richard Nixon to turn
over his tapes. Id.
" See WIGMORE, supra note 25, § 2286, at 537 (most attempts to legislate new privileges
are due to efforts of organized occupational groups acting in their own self-interest).
" See Leslie, supra note 89, at 34 (newspapers can be "put at a terrible competitive dis-
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"fourth estate"-protecting the polity from governmental de-
ceit."8 However, a recent media survey raised doubt that that
same polity would cede to the press privileges beyond, or even
commensurate with, those they already enjoy."
CONCLUSION
The conferring of privileges becomes difficult because their in-
vocation usually entails the abridgement of some concomitant or
coequal right. Under constitutional analysis, it is doubtful that we
should accept such abridgement imposed on the basis of profes-
sion or status. By statute, a press privilege is properly conferred,
but questions of accountability remain.
advantage because of . . . scrupulousness." (quoting Allan M. Siegal, News Editor, The
New York Times)); see also Beaver, supra note 47, at 249 (not only do media serve public
interest, but are "private businesses, quite validly conducted for economic gain"); Note,
supra note 92, at 188 (same); see generally Felder, When Headlines are Bought, BARRISTER 14
(Fall 1980) (overview of problems attending media practice of purchasing sensational
stories).
Media institutions readily seek protection of their economic interests through the courts.
See Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178, 184 (1946) (because press is a
business it is not exempt from general business laws); Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, 415
U.S. 394, 396 (1974) (plaintiff seeking recovery for copyright infringement).
" See CONSTrTUTONAL LAW, supra note 75, § 16.6, at 835-36; Coleman, A Free Press: The
Need to Ensure an Unfettered Check on Democratic Government Between Elections, 59 TUL L.
REV. 243, 244 (1984). It is generally theorized that "the press would serve as a nongovern-
mental 'fourth branch' of government, a check against the abuse of power ... ." Id. See
also Van Alstyne, The First Amendment and the Free Press: A Comment on Some New Trends and
Some Old Theories, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 10-11 (press frequently described as "fourth
estate").
Proponents of Shield Law legislation have indicated their belief that an unfettered press
is an aid to criminal justice. See C. WHALEN, supra note 9, at 137-38. But cf. Newsman's
Privilege Legislation, supra note 9, at 29 ("[Rieporters rarely have information as to specific
crimes or guilt or innocence .... " (quoting William Cahn, District Attorney, Nassau
County, New York)).
For a discussion of the detriment to the administration of justice caused by grand juries
and prosecutors leaking information to the press in confidence, see Dershowitz, When Pros-
ecutors Violate Confidentiality, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1987, at A19, col. 1.
" See Denniston, The Public Grades the Press, WASH. JOURNALtSM REV., March 1986, at 46.
A Gallup poll found that 89% of those surveyed believed that the press should be accounta-
ble in libel actions, and that freedom of the press should not encompass the right to say
anything regardless of accuracy. Id. Contrary to existing libel law, 75% of those surveyed
said that private parties and public officials should have an equal opportunity to prevail in
libel actions against the press. Id.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 580 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1968). Alexander Hamil-
ton, on freedom of the press, wrote that "whatever fine declarations may be inserted in any
constitution respecting it, must altogether depend on public opinion, and on the general
spririt of the people and of the government." Id.
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In Knight-Ridder, the dissent stressed the need for an absolute
and unqualified media privilege, but the proposal was based more
on rhetoric than substance. The ability to precisely measure the
effects of compulsory disclosure on news gathering remains ques-
tionable. Therefore, states must enact shield law legislation with a
view to the media's vital role in informing the public, but equally
mindful of its enormous influence. It is only with such an aware-
ness that an appropriate privilege for the press may ultimately be
achieved.
Stephen G. Mason

